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LAW SCHOOL CLINICS AND THE 
FIRST AJVIE:t'\]"DMEl\fT 
Jonathan L. Entin t 
Professor Babich has provided us with a troubling account of 
external pressures brought to bear on a highly regarded clinic at 
Tulane Law School.1 Professor Joy has put the Tulane stmy into 
broader context with accounts of other clinics that have encountered 
similar criticism and efforts to confine their activities. 2 In this brief 
comment, I want to raise questions about the extent to which law 
school clinics could successfully assert First Amendment defenses 
against outside efforts to restrict their activities in the event that such 
pressure were to result in litigation. 
The discussion proceeds in three stages. First, I will offer other 
examples in which law reform has generated political backlash. The 
frequency of the phenomenon should come as no great surp1ise. 
Perhaps the haves do not always come out ahead, 3 but just as the race 
is not always to the swift or the battle to the strong,4 we should expect 
the haves to defend their position vigorously.5 
Second, I will address some First Amendment issues that bear on 
this subject. Specifically, I will examine the implications of Garcetti 
v. Ceballos,6 a 2006 ruling that takes a restrictive view of the speech 
rights of public employees and therefore might have troubling 
implications for clinics at public law schools. I will also examine 
Legal Sendces Corp. v. Velazquez/ a pre-Garcetti case that points in 
t Professor of Law and Political Science, Case Western Reserve University. E-mail: 
jle@case.edu. 
1 Adam Babich, De-Lawyering Legislation and Environmental Law Clinics: Can the 
Preemption Doctrine Protect Participation Rights?, 61 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1109 (2011). 
2 Peter A Joy, Govemment Interference with Law School Clinics and Access to Justice: 
When Is There a Legal Remedy?, 61 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1087 (2011). 
3 See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 95 (1974). 
4 See Ecclesiastes 9:11 ("I again saw under the sun that the race is not to the swift, and 
the battle is not to the warriors, and neither is bread to the wise, nor wealth to the disceming, nor 
favor to men of ability; for time and chance overtake them all."). 
s Cf THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 655 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006) (noting that 
Damon Runyon is said to have observed: "The race is not always to the swift nor the battle to 
the strong-but that's the way to bet."). 
6 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
7 531 u.s. 533 (2001). 
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the other direction by treating the activities of government-funded 
lawyers as private speech rather than government speech. 
Third, I will pick up on a hint in Garcetti that academic freedom, 
which has important First Amendment aspects, might bear on the 
extent to which law school clinics enjoy legal protection against some 
of the egregious assaults that Professors Babich and Joy recount in 
their articles. In doing so, however, I will point to some ambiguities 
in the law of academic freedom and in the nature of law schools that 
might limit the extent of protection that academic freedom provides to 
clinics. 
I. LAW REFORMERS AND OTHER TARGETS OF BACKLASH 
Dming my first week at Nmihwestem University School of Law, 
one of my professors was installed in an endowed chair. In his 
remarks at the installation ceremony, Jon Waltz did not address 
anything related to the law of evidence or trial procedure, in which he 
had gained prominence,8 or health law, in which he had done 
pioneering scholarship.9 Instead, he talked about his peripheral 
involvement in the Chicago 7 case, which grew out of the violence 
surrounding the 1968 Democratic National Convention. 10 Waltz 
consulted with defense lawyers William Kunstler and Leonard 
Weinglass about some evidentiary issues in the case. 11 He also 
testified as a defense witness at the retrial of the defendants and their 
8 See, e.g., JON R. WALTZ, INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (4th ed. !997); JON 
R. WALTZ, THE NEW FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: AN ANALYSIS (2d ed. 1975); JON R. 
WALTZ & ROGER C. PARK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE (8th ed. 1995) (a frequently 
cited casebook that is still in print as JON R. WALTZ, ROGER C. PARK & RICHARD D. FRIEDMAN, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE (11th ed. 2009); JOHN KAPLAN & JON R. WALTZ, THE 
TRIAL OF JACK RUBY (1965); Jon R. Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a 
Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U. L. REV. 289 (i 964); Jon R. 
Waltz, Judicial Discretion in the Admission of Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
79 Nw. U. L. REv. 1097 (1985); Jon R. Waltz, The Present Sense Impression Exception to the 
Rule Against Hearsay: Origins and Attributes, 66 IOWA L. REV. 869 (1981). 
9 See, e.g., JON R. WALTZ & FRED E. INBAU, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE (1971); Jon R. 
Waltz, The Rise and Gradual Fall of the Locality Rule in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 18 
DEPAUL L. REV. 408 (1969); Jon R. Waltz & Thomas W. Scheuneman, Informed Consent to 
Therapy, 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 628 (1970); Jon R. Waltz & Carol R. Thigpen, Genetic Screening 
and Counseling: The Legal and Ethical Issues, 68 NW. U. L. REV. 696 (1973). 
10 There is a voluminous literature about that case, especially the original trial. See, e.g., 
JASON EPSTEIN, THE GREAT CONSPIRACY TRIAL: AN ESSAY ON LAW, LIBERTY AND THE 
CONSTITUTION (1970); J. ANTHONY LUKAS, THE BARNYARD EPITHET AND OTHER 
OBSCENITIES (1970); JOHN SCHULTZ, THE CHICAGO CONSPIRACY TRIAL (rev. ed. 1993). 
11 See Jon R. Waltz, On Being Monitored, 212 NATION 113, 113 (1971) [hereinafter 
Waltz, Monitored] (noting that his consultation with the Chicago 7 defense team had made him 
the target of military intelligence); Jon R. Waltz, Wind-Up of the Chicago 7, 218 NATION 78,78 
(1974) (hereinafter Waltz, Wind-Up]. 
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lawyers on contempt charges after their original convictions were 
overturned on appeal. 12 
Professor Waltz focused ills remarks at the chairing ceremony on 
his connection to the original trial. That chaotic proceeding was 
presided over by Judge Julius Hoffman, a prominent graduate of the 
law school who had many influential friends and suppmiers. 13 Indeed, 
Hoffman was such a prominent alumnus that the law school had 
named a classroom for him-a room in which Waltz refused to teach. 
Judge Hoffman's supporters were outraged that a faculty member, let 
alone one as prominent as Professor Waltz, would have anything to 
do with the defense in the case. According to Waltz, the c1itics 
approached the dean of the law school and the president of the 
university, demanding that he be fired and threatening to withhold 
future financial support. Pausing briefly for effect, he continued: "To 
their everlasting credit, the dean and the president told those people, 
in so many words, to go jump in Lake Michigan." He spent the rest of 
his career at Northwestern. 
In a similar vein, Edna Smith Primus, the protagonist in In re 
Primus, 14 had to go to the Supreme Court to overtum disciplinary 
sanctions imposed in connection with a challenge to a local 
sterilization policy. Primus, an officer of and cooperating attomey 
with the South Carolina affiliate of the Ame1ican Civil Liberties 
Union, addressed a meeting of low-income women who had been 
sterilized or threatened with sterilization as a condition for continued 
receipt of Medicaid benefits. 15 She advised the women of their legal 
rights and thereafter wrote to one of. those women saying that the 
12 Five of the seven defendants were convicted of at least some of the charges against 
them. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit overturned the criminal convictions 
against those five defendants and remanded for a new triaL United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 
340 (7th Cir. 1972). The Department of Justice decided against a retrial of the substantive case. 
In re Dellinger, 370 F. Supp. 1304, 1307 n.l (N.D. IlL 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 502 F.2d 
813 (7th Cir. 1974); see Waltz, Wind-Up, supra note 11, at 79. 
All of the defendants as well as Kunstler and Weinglass were held in contempt for their 
conduct during the original trial. The Seventh Circuit reversed all of the contempt convictions 
but remanded many of those counts for retrial before a different judge. In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 
3 89 (7th Cir. 1972). Professor Waltz testified for the defense at the contempt retriaL At one 
point during his testimony, the visiting judge presiding over the retrial asked: "Are you a 
movement lawyer?" SCHULTZ, supra note 10, at 380. Waltz was, in fact, a Republican. !d.; 
Waltz, Monitored, supra note 11, at 113. Several years later he ran unsuccessfully as a GOP 
candidate for the illinois Appellate Court. Jon R. Waltz, Some Firsthand Observations on the 
Election of Judges, 63 JUDJCA TURE 184 (1979). 
13 Judge Hoffinan received his law degree from Northwestern in 1915 and served as a 
state trial judge before his appointment to the federal bench in 1953. Biographical DirectOJy of 
Federal Judges: Hoffman, Julius Jennings, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, http://www.ijc.gov/ 
servletlnGetlnfo?jid= I 064&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Apr. 14, 2011 ). 
14 436 u.s. 412 (1978). 
15 Jd. at414-15. 
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ACLU was prepared to represent her on a pro bono basis should she 
want to sue. 16 That woman decided not to accept the offer. 17 The state 
bar imposed a private reprimand for the letter, which the authorities 
regarded as unethical solicitation of a client. 18 
The Supreme Court set aside the sanction. The Court emphasized 
that Primus had not solicited a prospective client in person and that 
her letter did not involve any prospect of "pecuniary gain." 19 Rather, 
she was promoting her "personal political beliefs" and "the civil-
liberties objectives of the ACLU" by advising the woman ofher legal 
rights.20 The letter "comes within the generous zone of First 
Amendment protection reserved for associational freedoms."21 The 
record contained no evidence of undue influence, overr-eaching, 
misrepresentation, or invasion of privacy that might have justified 
professional discipline,22 nor did it present any threat of frivolous 
claims that provides the basis for the bmntry doctrine. 23 
Both of these situations involved one-time episodes. More 
analogous to some of the challenges that law school clinics face is the 
effmi of several states to shut dmvn the NAACP's litigation efforts at 
the height of the civil rights movement. The leading example 
involved Virginia's attempt to outlaw the association's desegregation 
lawsuits as a prohibited form of barratry, but several other states also 
pursued the same goal.24 The theory was that the NAACP controlled 
the litigation and induced unsuspecting plaintiffs to lend their names 
to cases which they otherwise had no interest in pursuing. 25 The state 
legislature therefore amended its laws against soliciting legal business 
to include agents of an organization that hired a lawyer in connection 
16 Jd. at 416. 
17 Jd. at 417. The woman might have been pressured by her physician to drop the suit, but 
that possibility was never an issue in the proceedings. She took her youngest child to the 
doctor's office for an apparently routine visit. The doctor, in the presence of his lawyer, asked 
the woman to sign a document stating that she would not sue. I d. 
IB See id. at 417-21. 
J 9 I d. at 422. 
10 Jd. In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied heavily on its earlier ruling in NAACP v. 
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). See Primus, 436 U.S. at 427-28; infra notes 28-31 and 
accompanying text. 
11 Primus, 436 U.S. at 431. 
11 I d. at 434-35. 
13 Id. at 436-37. In reaching these conclusions, the Court distinguished a companion 
mling that upheld the imposition of sanctions against a private attorney for directly approaching 
two 18-year-old women who had been injured in an automobile accident and offering to 
represent them on a contingent-fee basis. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). 
24 See MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE 
SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961, at 273-74 (1994). 
15 See NAACP v. Harrison, 116 S.E.2d 55, 65-66 (Va. 1960), rev 'd sub nom. NAACP v. 
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
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with any case to which the group was not a pmiy and in which it had 
. . 26 
no pecumary mterest. 
The Supreme Court ultimately thwarted this stratagem, but not 
before the effmi diveiied considerable time and resources that the 
organization might have devoted to even more aggressive legal 
assaults on racism. 27 In NAACP v. Button,28 the Court held that the 
amended Virginia barrahy statute violated the First Amendment. The 
NAACP's legal activities were a fonn of political expression and 
association that enjoyed constitutional protection?9 Although the state 
had a legitimate interest in regulating the ethics and integrity of the 
legal profession, that interest did not justify the infringement on First 
Amendment freedoms that the regulation embodied.30 The NAACP's 
activities did not pose a danger of conflict of interest or financial gain 
by lawyers at the expense of their clients, so the state could not forbid 
the targeted mrangements. 31 
A final example of external pressure involves the legal services 
program. Originally part of the Office of Economic Opportunity, the 
federal antipoverty agency, the legal services program provides 
26 The Virginia legislative package included several other measures aimed at undermining 
the NAACP's litigation efforts. See TUSHNET, supra note 24, at 274-75. TI1e state courts 
invalidated the other measures. See NAACP v. Harrison, I 16 S.E.2d at 72; NAACP Legal Def. 
& Educ. Fund v. Harrison, 7 RACE REL. L. REP. 864 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1962). 
27 TUSHNET, supra note 24, at 273-74. 
2s 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
29 /d. at 428-29. 
30 /d. at 439-40. 
31 /d. at 443-44. 
This decision should be read against the background of concerted efforts by southern 
states to divert lhe NAACP from its larger mission, a move that was intended to reduce the civil 
rights activism that segregationists suspected the organization of fomenting. See generally 
NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSTVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH 
DURING THE 1950's, at 212-24; TUSHNET, supra note 24, at 283-300; Walter F. Murphy, The 
South Counterattacks: The Anti-NAACP Lav.,s, 12 W. POL. Q. 371, 374-80, 386-88 (1959). The 
Supreme Court rejected efforts to force the association to turn over its membership lists to state 
and local officials and struck down some other fonns of harassment. 
On attempts to force disclosure of membership lists, see NAACP v. Alabama ex rei. 
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); Louisiana ex 
rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961). The Alabama authorities did not get the 
message right away. Their case returned to the Supreme Court three more times. See NAACP v. 
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 360 U.S. 240 (1959) (per curiam); NAACP v. Gallion, 368 U.S. 16 
(1961) (per curiam); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964). For the full 
history of the Alabama case, see id. at 289-93. 
On oilier southern harassment of the NAACP, see, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 
(1960) (invalidating an Arkansas law requiring all public school teachers to disclose annually all 
organizations to which they belonged or contributed over the previous five years); Gibson v. 
Fla. Legis. Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963) (holding that a state legislative committee 
could not compel the president of a local NAACP branch to produce membership records in 
connection with his testimony because the committee had failed to show sufficient need for the 
information). 
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lawyers for low-income persons around the nation. 32 Because legal 
services lawyers sometimes challenge powerful private interests as 
well as local officials and policies, the program has generated a fair 
amount of controversy. In its early years, several governors opposed 
the program.33 The most prominent example involved Governor 
Ronald Reagan's 1970 veto of a grant to California Rural Legal 
Assistance, a high-profile agency that had successfully litigated test 
cases on behalf of agricultural workers, welfare recipients, and 
Medicaid patients.34 After a special commission made up of three 
state supreme court justices from elsewhere in the country exonerated 
CRLA of all charges of improper conduct asserted by Reagan's 
antipoverty director, OEO devised a compromise under which CRLA 
received continued funding while the state got a planning grant for 
another experimental program and the governor withdrew his veto. 35 
Even after the 1974 passage of legislation establishing the Legal 
Service Corporation as an independent, nonprofit entity, 36 the 
program has remained controversiaL In addition to the limitations at 
issue in Velazquez/7 LSC-funded programs and attorneys face many 
statutory restrictions, including bans on political activity, lobbying, 
fee-generating cases, and litigation relating to school desegregation 
and most abortions; there also are stringent limitations on class 
actions.38 Some of these restrictions have always applied to the 
32 For a detailed account of the creation of the legal services program, see EARL JOHNSON, 
JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE OEO LEGAL SERVICES PROGRA!vl 
39-70 (1974). For an account of the creation of local legal services agencies, see id. at 71-102. 
l3 See ALAN W. HOUSEMAN & LINDA E. PERLE, SECURJNG EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL: A 
BRIEF HISTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (2007) (noting that 
governors of Florida, Connecticut, Arizona, Missouri, North Carolina, North Dakota, and 
Mississippi took actions restricting funding to legal services programs); JOHNSON, supra note 
32, at 193 (stating that governors of five states vetoed funding for Legal Services). For other 
examples of controversies arising from legal services efforts, see id. 
34 See Michael Bennett & Cruz Reynoso, Califomia Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA): 
Survival of a Poverty Law Practice, l CHICANO L. REV. l, 7 (1972); Jerome B. Falk, Jr. & 
Stuart R Pollak, Political Jnte1jerence with Publicly Funded Lawyers: The CRLA Controversy 
and the Future of Legal Services, 24 HASTINGS LJ. 599, 606-10 (1973). 
35 For detailed accounts of the CRLA controversy, see HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 
33, at 15-16; Bennett & Reynoso, supra note 34, at 23-77; Faile & Pollak, supra note 34, at 
608-41. 
36 Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996-29961 (2006)). On the background to the corporation's creation, 
see HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 33, at 19-22. 
37 See ilifi·a notes 55-64 and accompanying text. 
38 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996e(d)(5), 2996f(b) (2006). In addition, various appropriations 
riders have imposed additional restrictions on LSC programs, including bans on advocacy 
relating to welfare reform and representation of foreign nationals. See HOUSEMAN & PERLE, 
supra note 33, at 36-37; Rebekah Diller & Emily Savner, Restoring Legal Aid for the Poor: A 
Call to End Draconian and Wastefitl Restrictions, 36 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 687, 693 (2009); 
Andrew Haber, Rethinldng the Legal Services Corporation's Program Integrity Rules, 17 VA. J. 
Soc. PoL'Y & L. 404,419-23 (2010). For discussion of the restrictions on welfare litigation, see 
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program, while others were adopted after the Reagan administration's 
unsuccessful campaign to abolish the program39 or in the wake of the 
Republican victory in the 1994 congressional elections.40 
Controversy over the legal services program, both under OEO and 
later under LSC, was quite predictable. To the extent that the program 
subsidizes lawsuits that challenge public policies, elected officials can 
be expected to react with skepticism if not outright hostility. A similar 
phenomenon occuned in connection with the cmm11unity action 
program, which was the centerpiece of the War on Poverty overseen 
by OEO. Mayors and other officials around the nation sought either to 
eliminate or to control local corrununity action agencies in order to 
minimize the political threat that those agencies posed.41 As the 
sociologist Lewis Coser put it: "I know of no government in history 
which has deliberately financed its own opposition."42 This 
observation does not necessarily make the criticisms of legal service 
legitimate, but it helps to explain their existence. 
Although the situations described in this section differ from those 
that Professors Babich and Joy discuss in their articles, we should 
anticipate similar reactions from those powerful entities that law 
school clinics challenge. The mlings in Primus and Button suggest 
that clinics might invoke constitutional protections to ward off some 
restrictions that might mise from outside attacks, but those attacks do 
not involve claims of barratry or other ethical lapses of the sort that 
were at issue in those cases. Nevertheless, a couple of other relatively 
recent Supreme Court decisions might bear on the status of law 
school clinics that face external pressure to handle only small cases 
on behalf of individual clients instead of larger cases that could have 
broader social, political, or economic impact. 
infra notes 5 5-64 and accompanying text. 
39 See generally HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 33, at 29-33; Ken Englade, The LSC 
Under Siege, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1987, at 66; Angela F. Turner, Comment, President Reagan and 
the Legal Sen,ices Corporation, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 711 (1982). 
40 See supra note 38. 
41 See DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, MAxiMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING: COMMUNITY 
ACTION IN THE WAR ON POVERTY 131-35, 142-46, 150-54 (1969); Elliott A. Krause, 
Functions of a Bureaucratic Ideology: "Citizen Participation," 16 Soc. PROBS. 129, 139-40 
(1968); Comment, Pm1icipation of the Poor: Section 202(a)(3) Organizations Under the 
Economic Opportzmity Act of 1964,75 YALE L.J. 599, 610-11, 613-14, 616-17 (1966) 
42 Quoted in Krause, supra note 41, at 140. Coser was hardly an advocate of consensus 
politics. He made his academic reputation with a thoughtful analysis of the uses of division. See 
LEWIS COSER, THE FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT (1956). 
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ll. SOME RECENT FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
Many law school clinics are part of public law schools, so 
restrictions on their activities might have First Amendment 
implications. Accordingly, this section considers the extent to which 
governmental restrictions on clinics affiliated with public law schools 
are likely to survive a constitutional challenge. It focuses on two 
recent Supreme Court decisions, both involving lawyers, that seem to 
point in different directions with regard to law school clinics. 
The first case, Garcetti v. Ceballos,43 found that public employees 
have no First Amendment protection for speech made in connection 
with their official duties.44 The case arose when a deputy district 
attorney, following an apparently common conversation with defense 
counsel in a criminal case, raised persistent questions about the 
accuracy of an affidavit that the office had submitted in support of a 
search warrant.45 The deputy was called to testify as a defense witness 
at a suppression hearing.46 Thereafter, he alleged, his superiors 
unconstitutionally retaliated against him in various ways. 47 
The Court recognized that "the First Amendment protects a public 
employee's right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen 
addressing matters of public concem"48 but nonetheless rejected 
Ceballos' claim because "his expressions were made pursuant to his 
[official] duties" as a deputy district attorney. 49 After all, "[ r ]estricting 
speech that owes its existence to a public employee's professional 
responsibilities ... simply reflects the exercise of employer control 
over what the employer itself has commissioned or created. "50 
Ceballos' activities were not those of a citizen but of a public 
•13 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
44 Garcetti is the latest in a series of cases in which the Court has addressed the speech 
rights of public employees. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (holding that 
public employees enjoy First Amendment protection for speech addressing matters of public 
concern but that an assistant district attorney's survey relating to internal policies did not, for the 
most part, address matters of public concern); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) 
(applying a balancing test and holding that a teacher could not be dismissed for writing letters to 
a local newspaper critical of district policies because the letters did address matters of public 
concern). See generally Cynthia Estlund, Harmonizing Work and Citizenship: A Due Process 
Solution to a First Amendment Problem, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 115 (criticizing the Supreme 
Court's approach to speech by public employees); Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First 
Amendment Lmv of Managerial Prerogative, 77 FORDHA!v! L. REV. 33 (2008) (endorsing and 
explaining the Court's approach in this area). 
45 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 413-14. 
46 !d. at 414-15. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. !d. at 415. 
47 Ceballos claimed that his job responsibilities were changed and that he was transferred 
to a different courthouse and passed over for promotion. !d. 
48 !d. at 417. 
49 !d. at 421. 
so !d. at 421-22. 
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employee. Although the First Amendment allows public employees to 
"contribut[ e] to the civic discourse," it does not give them "a right to 
perform their jobs however they see fit."51 Any other conclusion 
would lead to "permanent judicial intervention in the conduct of 
governmental operations to a degree inconsistent with sound 
principles of federalism and the separation of powers. "52 
The logic of Garcetti suggests that clinicians at public law schools 
could not asse1i a successful First Amendment defense against 
restrictions on the types of cases they pursue if those restrictions are 
imposed by officials who have supervisory authority over their work. 
Clinicians at such schools are public employees, and the work they do 
in selecting cases and representing clients is part of their official 
duties. Because Garcetti says that the First Amendment offers no 
protection to public employees in the performance of their official 
duties, it is likely that restrictions on the types of cases that clinics at 
public law schools may take would survive a legal challenge. 
Two caveats are in order before we accept this conclusion. First, it 
is possible to argue that cases handled by clinics at law schools 
involve matters of public concem. Garcetti by its terms does not 
apply to such situations. Unfortunately, the facts of Garcetti show 
that this argument cmmot succeed. Criminal cases, like those at issue 
there, do involve the public. Indeed, crime has long been a matter of 
public concern. But the Garcetti Court focused less on the general 
interest in crime than on the work responsibilities of the deputy 
district attorney. His job was to work on criminal cases subject to 
oversight by his superiors. On this view, clinicians are employed to 
handle cases and train aspiring lawyers. In doing so, they are acting 
not as citizens but as public employees. 
Second, it might be that the apparently bright-line rule of Garcetti 
does not apply in the academic setting. The Court recognized that 
"expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction" 
might enjoy broader constitutional protection but explicitly declined 
to resolve that question. 53 We shall tum to the question of academic 
freedom in the next section. Before doing so, however, we should 
address the other recent case that bears on the First Amendment rights 
of lawyers who are employed by the govemment. 
51 !d. at 422. 
52 !d. at 423; cf Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349-50 (1976) (rejecting a tem1inated 
police officer's procedural due process claim by noting that federal courts are "not the 
appropriate forum in which to review the multitude of personnel decisions that are made daily 
by public agencies" despite "the harsh fact that numerous individual mistakes are inevitable" in 
that process and concluding that "[t]he United States Constitution cannot feasibly be construed 
to require federal judicial review for every such error" (footnote omitted)). 
53 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425. 
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As noted earlier, legal services lawyers face several statutory 
restrictions on their work. 54 One of those resh·ictions was struck down 
in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez. 55 At issue in that case was an 
appropriations tider that prohibited legal services lawyers from 
seeking to amend or challenge the constitutionality of welfare laws. 56 
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the rider funded 
government speech. Earlier cases, notably Rust v. Sullivan,57 had 
upheld viewpoint-based restrictions where the government itself was 
the speaker or where the government had used private speakers to 
. 58 
convey 1ts own message. 
According to the Velazquez Collli, the legal services program "was 
designed to facilitate plivate speech, not to promote a governmental 
message."59 Moreover, the rider placed "a substantial restriction" on 
that plivate speech.60 It undemuned the "traditional role" of lawyers61 
and, by preventing them from presenting selious questions about the 
validity of welfare statutes and regulations, also threatened the 
independence and integrity of courts that rely on attorneys who are 
supposed to advance "all the reasonable and well-grounded 
arguments necessaty for proper resolution" of cases.62 Because the 
rider sought "to draw lines around the [legal services] program to 
exclude fi·om litigation those arguments and theories Congress finds 
unacceptable but which by their nature are within the province of the 
comis to consider,"63 the resttiction constituted impermissible 
viewpoint discrinlination in violation of the First Amendment. The 
5
" See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. 
55 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
56 The tider at issue provided in relevant part prohibited the use of LSC funds for the 
purpose of 
initiat[ing] legal representation or participal[ing] in any other way, in litigation, 
lobbying, or mlemaking, involving an effort to reform a Federal or State welfare 
system, except that this paragraph shall not be construed to preclude a recipient from 
representing an individual eligible client who is seeking specific relief from a 
welfare agency !f such relief does not involve an effort to amend or othenvise 
challenge existing law in effect on the date of the initiation of the representation. 
Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. l 04-134, 
§ 504(a)(l6), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-55 to 1321-56 (emphasis added). This rider was earned over 
in subsequent years and remained in effect when Velazque::; was decided. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 
538. 
57 500 U.S. 173 (1991 ). 
53 Velazque:::, 531 U.S. at 541. Rust upheld a ban on discussion of abortion by federally 
funded family-planning programs. 500 U.S. at 179-80, 193-95. 
59 Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542. 
60 !d. at 544. 
61 !d. 
6
' !d. at 545. 
63 !d. at 546. 
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Court rejected the argument that the restriction sought only to define 
the scope of the program, waming: "Congress cannot recast a 
condition on funding as a mere definition of its program in every 
case, lest the First Amendment be reduced to a simple semantic 
exercise. "64 
Velazquez might help law school clinics that receive government 
funding to fend off some restrictions on the types of cases that they 
take. If publicly funded law school clinics are engaged in private 
speech, then governmental prohibitions or limitations on their work 
might constitute viewpoint discrimination. Of course, the answer 
might depend on the natme of the govemmentally imposed 
restriction. After all, Velazquez did not address a complete ban on 
certain kinds of cases; the rider at issue limited the kinds of legal 
arguments that legal services lawyers could make in cases that those 
lawyers were pennitted to handle. The Supreme Court noted that 
federal law prohibits legal services lawyers :fi-om working on whole 
classes of cases-including most crinunal cases as well as matters 
involving nontherapeutic abortions, school desegregation, and 
selective service-but did not suggest that such subject-matter bans 
were constitutionally problematic.65 Velazquez emphasized that the 
govemment had no obligation to maintain a legal services program 
but that, having decided to create such a program, the government 
could not insulate its laws fi:om constitutional attack by the lawyers it 
had chosen to fund. 66 
Two points seem to follow from this discussion. One is that 
properly promulgated restrictions on the kinds of cases that publicly 
funded law school clinics are allowed to take or the types of clients 
that they are pennitted to represent might pass muster. Velazquez 
apparently rejects only limitations on the kinds of legal arguments 
that govemment-subsidized lawyers may assert. On this view, 
subject-matter restrictions are less problematic than viewpoint-based 
limitations. 
The other is that, read narrowly, Velazquez might not be directly 
relevant to clinics at private law schools (and perhaps at some public 
schools) that do not receive govemment ftmds. After all, that case 
addressed only a funding restriction. But the decision rejected the 
64 !d. at 547. 
65 Jd. at 537-38. 
66 Id. at 548. The govemment does have a constitutional obligation to provide legal 
counsel to indigent criminal defendants. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). But see Scott v. Tilinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) 
(limiting the right to counsel to cases in which a defendant is sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment). The Supreme Court has never required any specific method for providing 
lawyers to indigent c1iminal defendants who are entitled to counsel. 
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restriction as unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. Accordingly, 
if government cannot condition the award of funds on a grantee's 
agreement not to advance certain kinds of legal arguments, it must 
follow that government may not directly forbid lawyers from 
advancing those arguments even if the lawyers do not receive public 
subsidies. Again, however, narrower restrictions could be more 
difficult for unsubsidized clinics to attack than viewpoint-based 
restrictions. 
This second point receives some support from a case involving a 
previous attempt to restrict the work of Professor Babich's clinic. In 
1999, the Louisiana Supreme Court promulgated regulations that 
tightened eligibility requirements for clients of law school clinics and 
prohibited law students from serving as attorneys under the student-
practice rule for any client whom the clinic had contacted for the 
purpose of representation.67 The new rules, apparently adopted in 
response to political pressure and complaints from business 
interests, 68 survived a constitutional challenge. 
In Southern Christian Leadership Coriference v. Supreme Court of 
Louisiana,69 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
upheld the revised student-practice rule. The more stringent client-
eligibility requirements promoted the goal of providing legal 
representation to those who could not afford to hire their own 
lawyers. 70 The limits on solicitation satisfied the First Amendment. 
Distinguishing Button and Primus, which involved efforts to ban 
solicitation of clients, the Fifth Circuit explained that the Louisiana 
rule did not prohibit any speech but merely limited the roles that 
clinic students could play in cases in which the clinic had made the 
initial contact with the client. 71 Because the students were not and 
could not be licensed as lawyers, the rule simply forbade them from 
acting as attorneys in certain clinic cases; they remained free to work 
as paralegals, researchers, or trial aides.72 Distinguishing Velazquez, 
the court explained that the rule did not restrict the types of cases that 
67 Under the revised rules, clinics could represent individuals or families with income up 
to 200 percent of federal poverty guidelines and community organizations if more than half of 
their members qualified for individual representation under the rule; such organizations also had 
to certify that they lacked the resources to hire private counseL LA. SUP. CT. R. XX, §§ 4-5. The 
restriction on students appearing in the role of attorneys applied to any case in which anyone 
associated with a clinic had initiated contact with the individual or organization./d. § 10. 
68 For the background to the amended Louisiana student-practice rule, see Peter A. Joy, 
Political lnteiference with Clinical Legal Education: Denying Access to Justice, 74 TuL. L. 
REV. 235,243-51 (1999). 
69 252 F.3d 781 (5th Cir. 2001). 
70 I d. at 789. 
71 !d. 
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clinics could take or the kinds of arguments that they could advance 
on behalf of those clients; the mle also did not actually forbid clinics 
fi·om soliciting clients but merely defined the roles that clinic students 
could play on behalf of clients whom the clinic had legitimately 
solicited.73 Finally, the alleged animus of politicians and business 
groups did not affect the validity of the otherwise viewpoint-neutral 
mles. There was no evidence that the Louisiana Supreme Comi 
shared such animus; at most the plaintiffs claimed that the comi had 
succumbed to political pressure.74-
If these very restrictive regulations can pass constitutional 
muster,75 law school clinics could face a daunting task in fending off 
stringent but carefully drafted limits on their activities. Regulations 
such as those struck down in Button, Primus, and Velazquez 
presumably could not be imposed on clinics, but facially neutral 
regulations that might undermine clinic operations might be upheld. 
Before concluding that reshictions on clinics are effectively immune 
from legal chall.enge, we should recall the Fifth Circuit's pointed 
remark that neither Tulane University nor any of its law school clinics 
challenged the Louisiana student-practice restrictions.76 It is not clear 
that the case would have come out differently had the university or 
any of its clinics been parties to the case, but the statement might 
imply that they could have advanced arguments based on academic 
freedom. The Garcetti Court also alluded to academic freedom but 
did not address the issue in any detail. 77 The next section discusses 
that subject. 
III. LAW SCHOOL CLINICS AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
Academic freedom encompasses "fi·eedom of inqui1y and research; 
freedom of teaching within the university or college; and freedom of 
extra-mural utterance and action."78 Although the idea of academic 
freedom emerged from conflicts between faculty members and boards 
of trustees,79 the Supreme Comi has recognized that at least some 
73 !d. at 791-92. 
74 !d. at 794. 
75 The executive director of the Association of A..merican Law Schools characterized the 
Louisiana regulation as the "most restrictive" of its kind. Joy, supra note 68, at 238 (quoting 
Carl C. MonJe). 
76 252 F.3d at 787-88. 
77 See supra text accompanying note 53. 
78 AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, 1915 DECLARATION OF PRll-lCIPLES ON ACADEMIC 
FREEDOM & ACADEMIC TENURE 292 (1915), available at bt1p://www.aaup.org/NR!rdon1yres 
I A6520A9D-OA9 A-4 7B3-B 550-C006B5B224 E7/0/1915Declaration.pdf. 
79 See MATTHEW W. FINKJN & ROBERT C. POST, FOR THE COMMON GOOD: PRINCIPLES 
OF AMERICAN ACADEMIC FREEDOM 24-27 (2009) (chronicling the tensions between academics 
and their governing boards, culminating with the fonnation of the AAUP and the promulgation 
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aspects of academic freedom enjoy First Amendment protection. 80 
For example, in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,81 Chief Justice Warren's 
plmality opinion warned that "impos[ing] any strait jacket upon the 
intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the 
future of om Nation."82 Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion 
offered a more extensive defense of free inquiry. 83 A decade later, in 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents,84 the Court characterized academic 
freedom as having "transcendent value to all of us."85 Those 
statements were dicta. In Swee.ry, the Court found that a state attorney 
general's investigation of allegedly subversive activities had not been 
properly authorized;86 in Keyishian, the Court held that a statute 
requiring the dismissal of faculty members for "treasonable or 
seditious" utterances was tmconstitutionally vague. 87 
In other cases, however, concerns about academic freedom appear 
to have played a more central role. For example, in Regents of the 
University of Michigan v. Ewing,88 the Court called for deference to 
faculty judgments about students' academic performance. That case 
involved a medical student who was dismissed for failing a 
of the 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom); Judith Areen, Government as 
Educator: A New Understanding of First Amendment Protection of Academic Freedom and 
Govemance, 97 GEO. L.J. 945, 952-53 (2009) (describing the emergence of conflicts between 
the faculty and governing boards resulting from the move away from narrow, religious-focused 
curriculums, to science-based instruction, original research and the development of scholarly 
expertise in a broad variety of disciplines); J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special 
Concern of the First Amendment," 99 YALE L.J. 251, 273 (1989) ("Disputes tended to be 
internal to the university, and academic freedom became conceived as an adjustment of rights 
among participants."); David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of "Individual" and 
"Institutional" Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Summer 1990, at 227, 233 (summarizing and supporting the AAUP's criticisms of boards of 
trustees' efforts to control professorial works as unduly constraining academic freedom). 
80 This essay focuses only on the ability of university-based law school clinics to assert 
First Amendment-based academic freedom against external pressure. Some of the cases 
discussed in this paragraph involve constitutionally based claims of academic freedom by 
individuals against external pressure. The extent to which academic freedom protects individual 
faculty members against adverse actions by trustees, administrators, or other faculty members is 
beyond the scope of this essay, but the question has generated thoughtful debate. Compare 
Rabban, supra note 79, at 280-300 (arguing that the First Amendment protects the academic 
freedom of individual professors in some circumstances), with Byme, supra note 79, at 301-ll 
(arguing that constitutional academic freedom does not protect individual faculty members 
against institutional action). 
Bl 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (Wan·en, C.J., plurality opinion). 
82 I d. at 250. 
B3 I d. at 261-64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result). 
84 385 u.s. 589 (!967). 
85 !d. at 603. 
86 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 253-55. 
87 Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 604; see id at 593 (quoting the statute). 
ss 474 U.S. 214 (!985). 
r 
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comprehensive exam. 89 In rejecting the student's procedural due 
process claim, the Court explained: "When judges are asked to review 
the substance of a genuinely academic decision, ... they should show 
great respect for the facu1ty 's professional judgment. "90 The judicimy 
should overturn an academic decision only if "it is such a substantial 
depmture from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the 
person or committee responsible did not actually exercise 
professional judgment."91 
Similarly, the Court has invoked academic freedom in two of its 
most significant affinnative action cases. Justice Powell's controlling 
opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,92 for 
instance, emphasized that academic fi·eedom was "a special concern 
of the First Amendment" that entitled the university to broad 
discretion in selecting its students. 93 That discretion was not 
unfettered: Justice Powell concluded that the quota system under 
which a state university's medical school reserved a specified number 
of seats in each entering class for members of designated racial and 
ethnic minorities violated the Equal Protection Clause.94 A quarter-
centmy later, in Grutter v. Bollinger,95 a five-justice majority 
endorsed Justice Powell's approach. In upholding the University of 
Michigan Law School's consideration ofrace as one factor in making 
admissions decisions, the Court deferred to the university's academic 
judgment about the educational importance of a diverse student 
body.96 
Bakke suggests, however, this deference to academic judgments 
has its limits. As the Court explained in University of Pennsylvania v. 
EEOC,97 a university has no privilege to withhold internal and 
external peer reviews of an unsuccessful candidate for promotion and 
tenure when the candidate alleges that her rejection· violated Title 
Vll.98 Academic freedom does not protect universities from 
compliance with such generally applicable civil1ights laws.99 Nor is 
Bakke the only affirn1ative action case in which the Court has rejected 
s9 Id at 216. 
90 I d. at 225. 
91 Jd. 
92 438 u.s. 265 (1978). 
93 Id at 312. 
94 I d. at 315-20. 
95 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
96 Id. at 328-29. 
97 493 u.s. 182 (1990). 
98 Id. at 189. 
99 I d. at 198 (reasoning that the protections of academic freedom are generally limited to 
cases where the government conduct intends to or does in fact direct the content of the 
university discourse). 
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a university's race-based admissions program. In Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 100 a companion case to Grutter, the Court invalidated the 
point system that the University of Michigan used for undergraduate 
admissions because that system gave all minority applicants the same 
substantial number of points and thus did not provide for 
individualized consideration. 101 
What do these cases imply about whether law school clinics could 
successfully assert an academic freedom claim to fend off external 
pressures on their work? At first blush, clinics seem to have a 
powerful argument that their operations fall within the classic 
definition of freedom to teach. Clinics are the predominant 
mechanism by which law schools satisfy the accreditation 
requirement to provide students with "live-client or other real-life 
practice experiences,"102 but that requirement does not mean that 
schools must operate their own clinics or provide every student with 
such real-life practice opportunities. 103 In other words, a law school's 
decision to operate a clinic appears to represent exactly the kind of 
academic judgment that deserves judicial deference. 
There are at least two reasons to question whether an academic 
freedom argument would succeed in court. First, it might be argued 
that academic freedom as recognized in the cases does not apply to 
the work of law school clinics. Institutional academic freedom, which 
protects universities from external interference, traditionally has been 
justified in the name of defending "the fundamental academic values 
of disinterested inquiry, reasoned and critical discourse, and liberal 
education."104 On this view, the government might well be permitted 
to regulate aspects of universities that are "unrelated to liberal 
studies."105 This is so because the concept of academic freedom rests 
on a commitment to detachment and disinterestedness. 106 Training 
students for the labor market is only peripherally, if at all, related to 
those values, the argument goes, so the governrnent might have 
greater latitude to regulate activities relating to vocational training. 107 
Law school clinics inculcate skills that are designed to prepare 
100 539 u.s. 244 (2003). 
10 1 !d. at 271-75. 
102 ABA Standards for Approval of Law Schools Standard 302(b)(1) (2010-2011). 
1oJ !d. Interpretation 302-5. 
104 Byrne, supra note 79, at 338. 
105 !d. 
106 See id. at 333-35 (discussing the merits of knowledge pursued with detachment as 
disinterestedness, arguing that this is one of the "indigenous values served by universities"). 
107 See id. at 332 (arguing that there is no reason in principle why the government cannot 
regulate university training encouraging the development of practical, career-related skills as it 
does private enterprises). 
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students for legal practice rather than detached and disinterested 
inquiry, so perhaps their work falls outside the boundaries of 
academic freedom, however this concept applies to other aspects of 
what law professors (including clinicians) do. 
There are other reasons to question whether academic freedom 
necessarily insulates law school clinics from external regulation. 
Clinics enable law students to appear in comi, under faculty 
supervision, in circumstances where they otherwise could not 
represent clients because the students have not been admitted to the 
bar. Student-practice rules are an integral pmi of the clinical 
experience: without such rules, promulgated by the judicimy, law 
students would not be able to perform lawyers' roles. Because 
students have no independent right to appear in court on behalf of 
clients, it is not clear that invoking academic freedom will add much 
to the more general First Amendment arguments against content-
based regulations of legal practice that prevailed in NAACP v. Button 
and Legal Sen1ices Cmp. v. Velazquez 108 or the First Amendment 
arguments that failed in Southem Christian Leadership Coriference v. 
S r> rL · · 109 Lpreme e-ourt OJ owszana. 
CONCLUSION 
It is not at all clear that either general First Amendment doctrine or 
academic freedom, to the extent that this concept rests on First 
Amendment considerations, will protect law school clinics from at 
least some external regulation. Nevertheless, the lmcertain prospects 
of judicial vindication should not occasion despair. After all, 
academic freedom is more than a legal concept that is enforced by 
courts. It also represents a powerful intellectual and social norm that 
can be used in the public m·ena to fend off attacks on universities. 110 
Professor Waltz's experience at Northwestern, where the law school 
and the central administration resisted calls for his ouster because of 
his role in the Chicago 7 case, 111 offers an optimistic example of how 
this nonn can be used effectively. 
JOB See supra notes 28-31 & 55-64 and accompanying text. 
Jo9 See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text. 
no See generally FINJUN & POST, supra 79. 
11 1 See supra Part I. 
